

The Category of Definiteness/Indefiniteness revisited

Violetta Koseska-Toszewa

The author aims to create a unified quantificational and situational model for describing formal means of the definiteness/indefiniteness category in Bulgarian and Polish languages based on Russell's theory of description and situation semantics of Barwise and Perry.

While not claiming to have embraced the whole variety of language manifestations of the definiteness/indefiniteness category, the author maintains the view that in semantic respect this category can be reduced to quantificational phenomena determined by the kind of the quantifier meanings and the interactions between these meanings in the framework of the sentence semantic structure.

The model of description is based on the classification of quantifier meanings: uniqueness, existentiality, universality, as well as on the notion of 'quantifier strength' which reflects the interrelations between two or more quantifiers. The latter allows us to notice the transition of some weak meanings of certain type, e.g. existential, into quantifier meanings of some other type, e.g. universal. This phenomenon can be observed in both languages most frequently in modal (possible and/or necessary) contexts.

In the present paper *the sentential character of the category of definiteness/indefiniteness* is recognized as a basic principle. This necessitates the consideration not only of quantifier meanings in the nominal phrase, but also in the verbal phrase. The same necessity applies to Ajdukiewicz's idea of not complete articulated quantification in the nominal phrase which is here extended also to the verbal phrase.

1. *The category of Definiteness/Indefiniteness as a sentential category.*

Up to now, the study of the definiteness/indefiniteness category has usually been reduced to a description of the morphological means for expressing it in article languages, or to a description of the lexical means in article-free languages, corresponding to the meanings carried by the definite and the indefinite article. The influence of morphology is revealed by the fact that the definiteness/indefiniteness category was studied on the syntactic level only as a category of a noun phrase. By such an approach semantic analysis of the category was reduced to a description of some of

the meanings of definite and indefinite articles in article languages. In article-free languages, semantic descriptions were aimed at analysing mainly the meanings of the pronominal language means. However, the meaning of definite or indefinite article, as well as the meaning of a given pronoun, is determined by the overall structure of the sentence, not only by the noun phrase, hence such descriptions have been not only incomplete, but sometimes untrue. Another methodological problem was the fact that, as a rule, the linguists investigating the definiteness/indefiniteness category, have used as a starting point the form, not its content. This resulted in other problems with which the linguists were unable to cope, such as polysemy of the form within a given semantic category or within several semantic categories. Hence a uniform model for description of formal linguistic means has turned out to be indispensable, a model which should cover the meanings of a given form not only in one semantic category, but in different semantic categories as well. To illustrate the significance for our study of the fact that the formal linguistic means express definiteness/indefiniteness on the level of the overall structure of the sentence, we shall take as an example the meaning of the Polish pronoun *ten* "this" in the sentence:

- (1) Ten Pan, który przed chwilą pytał o ciebie, jest na korytarzu. / Tozi gospodin, kojto popita predi malko za tebe, e v koridora.
The gentleman who has been asking about you just now, is in the corridor

where *ten* means "only this one" and is a formal means expressing quantificational uniqueness. On the other hand, in the sentence:

- (2) Ten, kto dużo pracuje, czasu nie manuje. / Toz, kojto raboti mnogo, ne gubi vreme.
He, who works a lot does not waste his time.

The same form means "every one" and expresses quantificational universality. The same holds for the Bulgarian pronoun *tozi* "this" in the sentence *Tozi, kojto te tãrsi predi malko, e sega v koridora* "That man who asked for you some time ago, is now in the corridor", where it means "this one", i.e. quantificational uniqueness. However in the sentence *Toz, kojto padne v boj za svoboda, toj ne umina* "He, who falls in the fight for freedom never dies", its meaning coincides with the meaning of "every one" and expresses quantificational universality. The definite article -ãt "the" in *čovekãt* "the man" means "this very person", "just this person" in the sentence *čovekãt te tãrsi veče tretãi pãt* "The man has already asked for you three times" but it has the meaning of "every person" in the sentence *čovekãt e smãrten* "A man is mortal". As we see the noun phrase is identical in both sentences, but its quantificational content is totally different. Indeed: in the first sentence the form expresses uniqueness, i.e. 'definitiveness', and in the second universality, i.e. 'indefiniteness'. The sentential character

of the category of definiteness/indefiniteness solves the problem of the Verb Phrase in the sentence, which is a key problem for our study, on these problems refer to Koseska (1970), Koseska-Toszewa (1976, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1985, 1987), Koseska-Toszewa & Gargov (1990). As we see from item 1 we can speak about a quantificational model of the definiteness/indefiniteness category only if we apply it both to the Noun Phrase and the Verb Phrase, i.e. on the level of the overall structure of the sentence. This is what makes the quantificational model used by us different from the well-known model of Barwise and Cooper which is applied only to the Noun Phrase. Cf. Barwise & Cooper (1981).

2. Quantificational meanings of existentiality, universality, uniqueness in Bulgarian and Polish.

Using the standard definitions of logical quantifiers and the jota-operator we discern here three basic quantificational (quantifier) meanings, defined through the linguistic exponents of the logical quantification and definite description, see Rasiowa (1975: 211-225), Russell (1967: 253-293), Reichenbach (1967: 85-216), Koseska-Toszewa (1982).

2.1. We view existentiality as the content of linguistic expressions which we could render through the logical form $(\exists x)P(x)$. We could interpret the content of these expressions most generally in the following way. There is at least one x such that P / There is one x which P . There is such x that P/P is valid for some x which satisfies the predicate (propositional function) P . Existentiality is expressed both in Bulgarian and Polish by lexical, morphological and syntactic means. In Bulgarian we find all these means in the nominal phrase in the place of the subject. e.g.: *Njakakvo kuče lae na dvora* "Some dog is barking in the yard" (lexical); *Deca vikat na ulicata* "Some children are shouting in the street" (morphological); *Njakoã te tãrsi po telefona* "Someone is asking for you on the telephone" (lexical). Unlike Bulgarian, in Polish existentiality is not expressed through morphological means in the nominal phrase, for example in the place of the subject, cf.: *Jakiã pies szczeãka na ulicy* (lexical), "Some dog is barking in the street"; *Na ulicy szczeãka pies* (not finished utterance, see below) "A dog is barking in the street"; *Ktoã ciã szuka* (lexical) "Someone is asking for you". In the verbal phrase in both languages existentiality is expressed through lexical as well as morphological and syntactic means, e.g.: *Ot vreme na vreme se čuvãba gãrmeži* "We could hear shots from time to time" (through lexical means and reservation of existentiality through the form of the Imperfectum); *Chodzilimã do nich z wizytã od czazu do czazu* "We visited them from to time" (lexical and reservation of existentiality through preterite of verbs of imperfective aspect).

2.2. We view universality as the content of linguistic expressions which we could render through the logical form $(\forall x)P(x)$. We could interpret these expressions in the following way: P is valid for every x / every x satisfies the predicate P . Universal quantification in both languages is expressed morphologically, lexically and syntactically only in the Verb Phrase. The universal noun phrase has morphological exponents only in Bulgarian, cf. some sentences with a noun phrase in the position of the subject: *Vsički hora sa smártni* "All people are mortal" (lexical); *Horata sa smártni* "People are mortal" (morphological); *Nikoj ne te e társil* "Nobody has asked for you" (lexical); *Káždy pies lubi stodycze* "Every dog likes sweets" (lexical); *Zadne listy jej nie cieszą* "No letters make her happy" (lexical).

As we have already mentioned, in the Verb Phrase the means expressing universality are lexical, morphological and syntactic. Cf. the Verb Phrase in the position of the predicate in the following sentences: *Prijatelite mi vinagi se dáržat prílično* "My friends always behave themselves" (lexical and reservation of universality through the form of the Present); *Te níkogá ne bodeba na razbodka v 5 časa* "They never went for walks at 5 sharp" (lexical and reservation of universality through the Imperfectum); *Dziedi pani Marii zachovujú się zawsze bardzo grzecznie* "Maria's children always behave properly" (lexically and reservation of universality through the Present); *Zwykłe chodziliśmy na spacer y o piątej* "They never went for walks at 5 sharp" (lexically and reservation of universality through preterite of verbs of imperfective aspect).

2.3. We view uniqueness as the content of linguistic expressions, which we could render through the following logical forms: $(\exists x)P(x)$, and similarly for sets $(\exists X)P(X)$. The given logical forms shows that uniqueness means that the predicate is satisfied only for one element of the given set or that the predicate is satisfied for the whole set and only for it. We examine the logical forms containing a jota-operator together with the universal and existential logical forms, in this respect we follow Barwise and Cooper (1981). We interpret the expressions containing jota-operators in the following way: "That which in this element or set satisfies the given predicate" / "Only this element or only this set satisfies the given predicate". Once again in both languages uniqueness is expressed morphologically, lexically and syntactically in the Verb Phrase. In the Noun Phrase only Bulgarian uses morphological means expressing this quantificational meaning. Cf. the sentences with a single Noun Phrase in the position of the subject: *Tozi máž veče tretí pát píta za tebe* / *Ten męžczyzna juž trzeci Mážát te társi tretí pát* "This man has already asked for you three times" (lexically); (morphologically).

Uniqueness in the Verb Phrase in the position of the predicate can be expressed in both languages morphologically as well: *Marija zatvori jadosano*

vatata "Maria slammed the door angrily" (through aorist of verbs of perfective aspect). *Chłopiec stukł szymbę / Momčeto stúpi stákloto* "The boy has broken the window" (reservation of uniqueness through preterite of verbs of perfective aspect); *Raz tylko do niej napisal / Toj i napisá samo edin pát* "He wrote to her only once" (lexically and preterite of verbs of perfective aspect).

2.4. Proper Names and Uniqueness. As an exponent of uniqueness in natural language, the proper name, if it is a proper name in the logical sense, directly designates the object and for this reason it can be viewed as a 'complete symbol'. Having in mind Russell's theory of description and its notions which are fundamental for the present study, we should mention the changes in its application. These changes have been introduced by us and have been necessitated by the linguistic material of both languages, and especially of Bulgarian. As we have already mentioned, our quantificational model is 'situational', i.e. the given quantificational meaning is determined by the overall structure of the sentence and its 'paraphrase'. In this sense we can find some connection with Russell's idea about the incomplete symbol, according to which everything we view as description (definite or indefinite) is an incomplete symbol, i.e. unlike the proper name (in the logical sense) every description is dependent on the given context (Russell 1967). But in natural language not every proper name is a complete symbol. There exist such proper names which do not designate directly a single object. The difference between the logical and the linguistic definition of the proper name is quite considerable (Koseska & Gargov 1990). The fact that very often the proper name in natural language is an incomplete symbol is the reason for the use of the article with it in Bulgarian (cf. Bellert & Zawadowski forthcoming). The use of the article with proper names in Bulgarian is especially typical for colloquial language, in which, for example, most often diminutive proper names appear with the article: *Anito e tuk* "Ani is here". *Savata pristigna* "Sava has arrived". *Marijata e mnogo nadareno dete* "Maria is a very talented child". The definition of the proper noun is quite ambiguous in natural language, and according to it the proper name is not always a complete symbol. This is the reason to identify it with the definite description, and according to us this phenomenon leads to two opposite tendencies: the first, when the proper name in Bulgarian begins to behave as a definite description and can be used with the article definite; the second, when common names function as logical proper names, i.e. as a complete symbol, and they can be used without the article definite, for example this is the case with nouns denoting close kinship ties in Bulgarian: *bate, kaka, tata, tatko, mama, majka* typical Bulgaria word for addressing an elder, brother and sister, Dad, Father, Mum, Mother: *Majka si dojde / *Majkata si dojde*. "My mother come back / *The mother came back"; *Tatko si dojde / *Tatkoto si dojde* "Daddy came back = My Father came back / *The Father came back".

3. Relative quantification.

Every natural language restricts the quantificational scopes of the expressions in a way conditioned only by the language situation. In our model the expressed quantification is determined by the overall structure of the sentence. Sometimes we find ambiguity in quantificational expressions even on the level of the sentence; further on they are disambiguated by means of paraphrases used as simplified contextual (situational) conditions for the given quantificational meaning. When, for example, we say *Vseki e smarten* "Every man is mortal" referring to people, we restrict the quantificational scope of the expression *vseki* "every" to the set of all people, cf. the paraphrase *Vseki čovek e smarten* "Every man is mortal". From this example we can conclude that in natural language we always de facto use quantificational expressions whose meaning can be rendered by means of a logical form containing a quantifier with a relativized scope of the type: $(\forall x \in L)$, $(\exists x \in L)$, where L denotes the set of the elements which are the subject of discourse, i.e. the scope of quantification. In symbols this can be expressed by $(\forall x \in L)P(x)$, $(\exists x \in L)P(x)$, $(x \in L)P(x)$.

3.1. For us, logical quantification is a mechanism revealing the semantic link between the quantified object (element) or set and the actual way of generating all types of sentences in natural languages, i.e. both indicative and non-indicative sentences. For example, the set $x : x \text{ e } d\ddot{v}unogo \text{ s}\ddot{a}stestvo \text{ bes } pera$ "x is a biped without feathers" is the only set which gives the value of 'truth' to the predicate $P(X)$, if $P(X)$ means: "X is the set of all people" (i.e. here we have the sentence *Dvunogite s}\ddot{a}stestva bez pera sa hora* "Biped creatures without feathers are people". For the sentence *Horata sa dvunogi s}\ddot{a}stestva bez pera* "People are biped creatures without feathers" we have $(x : x \text{ e } \text{čovek})$ "(x : x is a person)" the only set which satisfies the predicate $P(X)$, where X is the set of all biped without feathers.

3.2. Every type of quantification, because of its nature, reduces the number of the free variables of the predicate. On account of this it is appropriate to associate them with quantification, to put the single object in the place of the given variable of the predicate, since this operation also reduces the number of the free variables of the particular predicate. (cf. Barwise & Cooper 1981).

4. Interpretation of the quantificational expression in natural language.

Natural language imposes some other conditions for the interpretation of the quantificational meaning of the expressions. (1) The association of a given expression with a particular type of quantification is not always

apparent. This is the reason for the existence of different classifications of the linguistic quantificational expressions; for example the Polish quantificational expressions *niektóre*, *niektórzy* "some" according to Grzegorzczak (Grzegorzczak 1972) are quantificational expressions of relative universality. According to us these expressions in a similar context: *Niektóre panie ubierają się modnie* "Some women dress fashionably" can be classified as existential quantificational expressions, see Koseska-Toszewa (1982). (2) Depending on the context on and the same expression in natural language can have different quantificational meanings, sometimes diametrically opposite. Let us consider this problem in more details. See Bellert (1971, 1978).

4.1. "Every one such that P" and "one such that P". In natural languages (for example Bulgarian, Polish, Russian, French, Roumanian and Albanian) one and same form can express both uniqueness, i.e. 'definiteness' and universality, i.e. 'indefiniteness', e.g. *Čovek\ddot{a}t te t\ddot{a}rsi veče tri p\ddot{a}ti po telefona* "The man has already asked for you on the phone three times / This very man has asked for you three times on the phone" — uniqueness. *Čovek\ddot{a}t e smarten* "Man is mortal / Every man is mortal" — universality. It is adopted in logic that the expression "every one such that" is a quantifier of universality. Its meaning is interpreted in the following way: "every element = all elements gives (give) a value of truth (can give a value of truth / must give a value of truth) to the predicate P": *Kazdy kr\ddot{a}tkowidz potrzebuje okular\ddot{o}w* "Every short-sighted person needs glasses". The expressions *každy*, *wszyscy* and the other means, having the same meaning in both languages in a context different from the mentioned above in natural language can mean also "the only set (most often of a number of elements which gives value to the predicate P". In this case we mark the meaning in the following way: $(\lambda X)P(X)$, e.g. *Každy čt\ddot{o}viek jest istot\ddot{a} rozumn\ddot{a} i mysl\ddot{a}c\ddot{a}* "Every man is a sensible and thinking creature". Our thesis is that the expressions every x, all x in natural language can mean not only universal quantification, but also a single object, which is a set of all x, being such that $P(X)$, i.e. $(\lambda X)P(X)$. Not only the above mentioned forms express universality and uniqueness. We find such semantic tendencies in the use of *ten / toz\ddot{i}* "this" and in the use of the Bulgarian definite article. Of great interest are the use of the Bulgarian form *edin* "one", which can express quantificational uniqueness, existentiality and universality, e.g. *Dnes v tret\ddot{i} klas zak\ddot{a}sn\ddot{a} (samo) edin učenik* "Today one (only one) pupil was late in the third form". The Polish *jeden*, *pewien* corresponds to this meaning of the Bulgarian *edin* "one" e.g. *W klasie Krzysia tylko jeden ucze\ddot{n} nie zda\ddot{t} matury* "In Christo's class only one student didn't take the general certificate examination". In both languages the form "one" can have existential quantificational meaning: *Edno dete (njak\ddot{a}kvo dete / dete) plače na d\ddot{o}bora* "One child is crying in the yard / Some child is crying in the yard / A child is crying

in the yard". In Polish we find *jedem* with this quantificational meaning more rarely than the Bulgarian "one", cf.: *Jedno (jakies) dziecko pyta o niego* "A child is asking for him. Some child is asking for him". The form *edim* in Bulgarian has another quantificational meaning, when it expresses universality, which is not the case in Polish, e.g. *Edim maž ne e istinski, ako ne e bil vojnik* "A man is not a real (man) if he has not been in the army". Seen in French: *Un homme qui n'a pas été soldat n'est pas un homme véritable*, from this we see that in French *un* is used with the meaning of universality as well. This form as an exponent both of universality and uniqueness is a fact bringing it very close together with the quantificational uses of the "definite article". This kind of analogous uses can be regarded as an indefinite article, cf. Tolstoy (1957), Ivančev (1978), Stankov (1984). With reference to this observation we will make a little digression and we will return once again to the notional and terminological problems, connected with the fact that the definite article in Bulgarian can express not only uniqueness quantificational content, but universal content as *vseki*, and the form *edim* can express not only existential and universal quantificational meaning, but unique quantificational content as well. See Koseska-Toszewa (1982). It is clear from the examples in item 4 that the use of the terms definite / indefinite article is not precise, and that here we observe mixing of the form with its function, something typical of the Traditional Grammar studies. We observe this phenomenon not only in the description of the uses of these the definite article in Bulgarian, but in the words on the uses of forms in other article languages, for example in French: *L'homme a fermé la porte*, where the definite article expresses uniqueness, i.e. definiteness and *L'homme est déjà reparti dans ses rêves réalistes*, where the definite article expressed indefiniteness, i.e. universality; In English: *The lion is a ferocious animal*, the definite article *the* expressing universality-indefiniteness and *The King of France is bald*, where *the* has a defining function (uniqueness). In a description such as ours, directed from content towards form the above mixing of function and form is impossible, in spite of the rather conventional use of the terms "definite", "indefinite article" here.

4.2. In cases like the above mentioned we observe an interesting linguistic phenomenon, which following Reichenbach, we shall call here "Equating of two different logico-semantic structures" (Reichenbach 1967). As we see from the preceding item, one and the same form can be an exponent of different types quantification. This is an important peculiarity of natural language, and here we should point out the fact that one and the same type quantification can have a numerous, although a closed formal inventory. We shall try to clarify this problem by analysing the meanings of the Bulgarian definite article. The development of the meanings of the article in Bulgarian can be traced fairly well due to the sentential character of the category. Our thesis is that the definite article in Bulgarian first

developed the meaning which we shall call here uniqueness of the object. The definite article transferred this quantificational meaning to sets of objects and began to express uniqueness of the set. As a result of the merging of two different logico-semantic structures, namely: (1) $(\lambda X)P(X)$ and (2) $(\forall x)P(x)$, the Bulgarian definite article began to express universality, i.e. the meaning marked with notation (2), see Koseska-Toszewa (1982, 1987). The great quantificational difference between the meaning uniqueness of the object and uniqueness of the set on one hand, and universality of the objects on the other, gives us grounds to treat these quantificational meanings as oonymous. Examples: (a) *Čovekăt sàs tova palto e ot našija kraj* "The man with this coat is a countryman", the definite article here expresses uniqueness of the element satisfying the predicate $x e ot našija kraj$; (b) *Čovekăt e đvunogo sàštestvo bez pera* "The man is a biped creature without feathers"—the definite article expresses uniqueness of the set, which is the only one to give the value of truth to the predicate $x e đvunogo sàštestvo bez pera$; (c) *Čovekăt e smàrten* "Man is mortal"—the definite article expresses universality and points out that the predicate $x e smàrten$ for all elements of the set *hora* "people".

4.3. As we have already mentioned, not only the definite article, but other formal means as well, express both universality and uniqueness in Bulgarian. We observe a similar phenomenon in article and article-free languages, e.g.: English: *The lion is a ferocious animal. The presidente of USA is visiting the Netherlands.* French: *L'homme est déjà reparti dans ses rêves* "The man always returns to his dreams". *L'homme a fermé la porte* "The man closed the door". Albanian: *Qeni është mik i njeriu*. "The dog is a friend of the man" *Libri është mbi tryeze* "The book is on the table". Roumanian: *Omul este murtor* "The man is mortal". *Omul a intrat in camera* "The man entered to the room".

4.4. The above thesis can be explained by taking into account the logico-semantic aspects of the definiteness/indefiniteness category. Nevertheless, can be also illustrated by the historical materials in Retkov's book published quite recently (Zaimov 1982: 5-9), where we observe the formation of the Old-Bulgarian definite article. In this book we cannot find the definite article having the quantificational meaning of universality. There *-at, -ta* newly-formed as a morphological means designate either uniqueness of the element, satisfying the predicate.

5. The quantificational model and the sentence in natural language.

In our model the relativization of the quantifiers always depends on the nature of the relevant variables. The notation in our model is deliberately reduced to the level of first-order logic, although we speak about

quantification according to relations and characteristics of the objects, not about quantification only according to objects. The model using notation of second-order logic for the aims of the description of quantification in natural language is rather complicated due to the Verb Phrase. Since this study has a contrastive character, we have chosen this kind of description here, while at the same time we are aware of the maximally simplified notation.

5.1. Let's examine the predicate $P(x, y, z, f, m)$ where x ranges over the set of living creatures, y ranges over the states of time, z ranges over the set of types of verbal actions, f ranges over the points in space of the action taking place, m ranges over the set of events. We can get the following Polish and Bulgarian sentences from such a predicate: *Maria czyta w swoim pokoju / Maria čete v stajata si* "Maria is reading in her room". The sentences have the following explication: "The only state - reading is true only for one single object—Maria, this state is not interrupted by any event and it goes only in one place—Maria's room". In these sentences we have the following type quantification: (1) unique - Maria $\rightarrow x$, is reading $\rightarrow y$, in her room $\rightarrow f$; (2) unique (for type of action) - read (she is only reading, not sleeping, singing, crying) $\rightarrow z$. In this model we can put all kinds of classes in the place of the variable (Koseska-Toszewa & Mazurkiewicz, 1988).

5.2. The fact that the type of action is unique in the sentence in natural language is quite important for the better understanding of our model, and it requires a more detailed explanation. Every verbal sentence in natural language has a uniquely quantified type of action. Both in the Bulgarian and the Polish sentence the type of action is represented as a 'generalized object'. Every sentence generated on our model has exactly this type of action. Besides carrying information about the action, quantified in the specific sentence as unique, the verb in both languages contains information about time; this can be expressed by the verbal form and by lexical means on the level of the whole Verb Phrase. The temporal information can have different quantification: unique, existential or universal. In other words the verbal form expresses an independent type of action and in every particular sentence it is quantified uniquely. The temporal quantification is connected not only with the verbal form, but also with the whole Verb Phrase, which can be quantified according to three types quantification, for example: *Jej dziecko chorowało od czasu do czasu / Deteto i boleduwaše ot vreme na vreme* "Her child was ill from time to time" where the type of verbal action is unique: "falls ill, does not sing", and the temporal quantification is existential: "falls ill from time to time". Compare also: *Ziemia obraca się wokół Słońca* "The Earth rotates round the Sun" where the type of verbal action *obraca się* "rotates" is unique, but the quantification according to time is universal.

5.3. Although the above chosen sentences are indicative in reference to mood, i.e. they bear information about truth or falsity of facts, rendered by a person, the quantificational model advanced here is not simply 'indicative'. It applies to sentences with functor for possibility or necessity. There is a zero modal functor of the model of the indicative sentence. Cf: $P(x, y, z, f, m)$. If the model applies to sentences with a functor for possibility, then it can be represented most generally in this way: $\diamond P(x, y, z, f, m)$. If it is for a sentence with a functor for necessity, it can be represented like this: $\square P(x, y, z, f, m)$. Let's consider this problem in more details. It is a well-known fact that in Polish and Bulgarian we find different distribution of quantifier expressions in sentences having the value of truth/falsity, and also in sentences having information about events which could be possible or obligatory, depending on the speaker's intention, see Koseska-Toszewa (1978, 1982). For instance the Bulgarian sentence: *Niakoј idva* "Somebody's coming" is grammatically correct and sensible, but the sentence: **Koj i da e idva* "Anyone is coming" is not admissible. If we compare the two sentences we shall see that they differ in the quantificational meaning of the noun phrase; in the first sentence it is existential: "somebody", and in the second universal (with relativized scope): "anyone". The two sentences are in the indicative, and it is not possible to use the universal quantificational expression in the second sentence. In sentences with a functor for possibility or necessity (obligation) the quantificational expression is possible, e.g.: *Da stane koj i da e!* "Anyone stand up!". We observe a similar phenomenon in Polish too. The pronoun *ktokolwiek* for instance is found only in modal contexts for possibility and/or necessity, unlike the pronoun *ktos* which appears in all types modal contexts, see Koseska-Toszewa (1982).

6. 'Pure' Predication.

Not every noun phrase within the structure of the sentence is quantificational. The essence of 'pure' predication can be described best by means of examples having the forms 'be' and 'have'. The Bulgarian form *ima* is more often met than the form *e* as compared with the Polish form *ma* and its contextual correlations with the form *jest*. One of the basic problems is when the forms *e/jest* "be" are copula and respectively when the forms *ima/ma* "have" can be copula. Before determining if the Bulgarian form "have" can be copula, let's consider Frege's trichotomy according to which, we can speak about copula when a given form expresses predication, interpreted here as: $P(a)$. In sentences like: *Ivan e mąż / Jan jest mężczyzną* "John is a man", *e/jest* "is" are copula. Both forms are not copula in sentences like: *Skott jest autorem 'Waverleya'* "Scott is the author of *Waverley*", where these forms express identity, not predication. The

differentiation of *ima / ma* "has" and *e / jest* "is" with the meaning of existential quantification shows the significance of Frege's trichotomy (*jest x* is not the same as *jest pewien x*; *ima x* is not the same as *ima edin x* "has some *x*" see differently from Hintikka (Hintikka 1980: 323-350). No matter how we define the predicate, there is a considerable difference between sentences of the type:

- (1) Toj e kominočistač / On jest kominiarzem
He is a chimney-sweeper
- (2) Kominočistač stoi na dvora / Kominiarz stoi na podwórku
A chimney-sweeper is in the yard
- (3) Toz, kojto stoi na dvora, e kominočistač / Ten, kto stoi na podwórku jest kominiarzem
The person in the yard is a chimney-sweeper.

The sentences (1) are typical exponents of sentences with a noun phrase which is predicational and determines the characteristic (feature) of the object by showing its belonging to the set of the "chimney-sweepers". The sentences (3) have a noun phrase which cannot be quantificational. Compare with Barwise and Cooper (1983); in their study they do not mention such a fact in connection with the noun phrase, and assume that every noun group can be quantificational. The verb phrase: "is a chimney-sweeper" contains a nominal verbal phrase. It is not possible for nominal phrases to be quantified without considerably changing the content of the sentences. We can define them as typical 'pure' predicate groups. If we paraphrase the sentences (2) as 'Some chimney-sweeper is in the yard' we shall have sentences with, non-fully articulated quantification (compare with Ajdukiewicz 1974) in both languages. *Kominočistač / kominiarz* "a chimney-sweeper" defines the existing object, mentioned in the sentence. The analysis shows that in this case the noun phrase requires a reserved place for the existential quantifier.

6.1. The examples in Bulgarian require a very precise definition of the cases when the definite article is absent in the noun phrase, when the latter is 'purely' predicational, existential or 'generic' (universal and or universal with a relativized scope). As we already know we do not use the Bulgarian definite article only in such cases. Compare the following types nominal groups: 1. Non-articulated existential nominal group *Dete e bolno / Chore jest dziecko* "Some child is ill", *Madž donese izvestieto / Mężczyzna przyniósł wiadomość* "A man has brought the message". These sentences have the following paraphrases: "Some child is ill" "Some man brought the message". It is important to point out that unlike Polish, in Bulgarian these sentences can have another interpretation and can be viewed as sentences with morphologically articulated existential phrase, where the morphological zero is equivalent to the indefinite article, see non-fully articulated quantification

(Ajdukiewicz 1974). In such cases the paraphrases of the same Bulgarian sentences have the indefinite article 'one': *Edno dete e bolno* "One child is ill".

6.2. Non fully-articulated articulated universal nominal phrase. Ivančev pays particular attention to this type nominal phrase in Bulgarian (Ivančev 1957). Let's study in more details the sentence:

- (1) Životno e raneno
An animal is wounded

by comparing it with:

- (2) Životnoto e raneno
The animal is wounded.

Sentence (1) has the paraphrase: "An animal, not anything else is wounded". Sentence (2) - the paraphrase: "The animal is wounded". The Bulgarian sentences have the following Polish equivalents:

- (1) Zwierzę zostało zranione.
- (2) To zwierzę jest ranne.

Because of the non-fully articulated quantification the sentence *Životno e raneno* "An animal is wounded" can have another paraphrase: *Njakakvo životno e raneno* with the Polish equivalent: *Jakieś zwierzę jest ranne* "Some animal is wounded". If we compare the Polish and Bulgarian sentences:

- (3) Zwierzę jest ranne / Životnoto e raneno
The animal is wounded
- (4) To zwierzę jest ranne / Tova životno e raneno
This animal is wounded
- (5) Jakieś zwierzę jest ranne / Njakakvo životno e raneno
Some animal is wounded
- (6) Zwierzę zostało zranione / Životno e raneno
An animal is wounded

we shall notice that Polish sentences (3) and (6) are formally different, although the noun phrase is the same. The cause for the difference in the content of these sentences is the adjective *ranny* in (3) participle *zraniony* in (6). *Ranny* provides a possibility to articulate the quantification of the Polish noun phrase as unique or universal; while *zraniony* gives a possibility to supplement the nominal non-fully articulated quantificational phrase as existential. In Bulgarian this semantic difference is achieved by the presence or absence of the definite article. In other words, in Bulgarian, the 'generic sense' is rendered by the absence of the definite article, while in Polish it is rendered by a difference on the level of the predicate. On the surface structure this difference can be explained by the fact that in such cases Polish uses a participle, not an adjective as a nominal part of the predicate.

The difference can be explained here if we consider the differences in the general contents of the participle and the adjective. The participle carries information about a state, interrupted by a past event, which is single. The state rendered in the sentence: *Zwierzę zostało zranione* is unique, and it can be only the rheme. The state rendered by the adjective can be unique or universal, depending on the context; and for this reason it can be both the theme and the rheme in the sentence, e.g.: *Zwierzę jest ranne / Żivotnoto e raneno* "The animal is wounded" can be interpreted as "is wounded", not for example "is hungry", i.e. here in Polish and Bulgarian the unique state 'wounded' is in the first place and is the strong quantifier in the sentence. But we can put *Żivotnoto, a ne deteto e raneno / Zwierzę, a nie dziecko jest ranne* "The animal not the child is wounded", in the first place and this will transform the first nominal phrase in both sentences into a rheme, i.e. it will have the outermost quantificational meaning.

6.3. In Bulgarian the universal nominal phrase may not be interpreted as quantificationally fully articulated if we assume that the absence of the definite article in this case is a morphological fact. It Polish it is always only quantificationally non-articulated. We find sentences with a defining character having "non-articulated universal nominal phrase" in both languages. With the first group defining nominal universal groups we can associate the nominal phrases in the following sentences: *Legenda—to nie zawsze prawdziwa historia / Legenda tova ne vinagi e pravdiv razkaz* "Legend is not always a true story". With the second group defining nominal universal phrases we can associate proverbs and sayings: *Cigular kàšta ne brani* "A rolling stone gathers no moss". The third group sentences with defining character have universal quantification with a relativized scope: *Màž, kojto ne e bil vojnik, ne e màž* "A man who has not been in the army is not a man". In Bulgarian we find parallel nominal phrases with the definite article in these three groups, e.g. *Legendata e kàs razkaz* "Legends are short stories". See Revzin (1979).

6.4. Let's compare the sentences of the type:

- | | |
|-----|--|
| (1) | Kàšta bez dvor ne e kàšta / Dom bez podwórka nie jest domem
A house without a yard is not a house |
| (2) | Kàšta, kojato e bez dvor ne e kàšta / Dom, przy którym nie ma podwórka,
nie jest domem
A house that is without a yard is not a house |
| (3) | Kàšta, v kojato njama dvor, ne e kàšta
A house in which there is no yard is not a house. |

In these Bulgarian and Polish examples the nominal groups in the position of the subject have universal quantification, which in Bulgarian can be viewed as articulated or non-articulated while in Polish it is only non-articulated. The paraphrase of this nominal groups is "every house".

According to our definition the nominal phrase in the function of the predicative: *kàšta in ne e kàšta, domem in nie jest domem* "house in is not a house" cannot have quantificational meaning in both languages. A new and interesting problem is posed by the nominal phrase *dvor / podwórko*. In the Bulgarian sentences (2) and (3) and in the Polish (2) this nominal phrase is "purely" predicational: "is without a yard / has no yard". In (1) Bulgarian and Polish sentences the same nominal phrase can be viewed as formally non-articulated. If we go back to the sentence: *Kàšta bez dvor ne e kàšta* "A house without a yard is not a house" and its Polish correspondence: *Dom bez podwórka nie jest domem*, we shall notice that from the point of view of the information definiteness/indefiniteness, the analysis of the overall structure of the sentence eliminates the possibility for the nominal phrase in the position of the subjects "house" to be quantified otherwise but as universal.

7. Strong and weak quantification.

The last problem discussed here concerns the notions of 'strong' and 'weak' quantification meaning (Koseska-Toszewa & Gargov 1990, Bellert & Zawadowski, forthcoming). These notions correspond to those of 'theme-rheme' in the sentence functional perspective theory (cf. Bogusławski 1977, Karolak 1989). This problem will be presented by a difference between 'weak' and 'strong' meaning of existentiality.

7.1. The distinction between weak and strong existentiality meanings within the frameworks of the nominal phrase enables us to formulate an additional semantic argument on the basis of which we distinguish between the use of Bulgarian linguistic means of the type: *njakoj x, njakakàv x, edin x* "a x, some x, one x", and the absence of an article form for the Bulgarian language. As it turns out, this absence brings about two different existential meanings. The approach adopted here is also of assistance for distinguishing between the uses of the Polish phrases: *pewien x, jakis x, jeden x, niektóre x, jakies x*.

If the position of the existentiality quantifier in the semantic structure of the sentence is the innermost, i.e. if it is within the scope of all the other quantifiers indicated by nominal and verbal phrases which are part of this sentence, then this is a weak meaning; compare: *Njakoe dete si igraše na dvora vinagi, kogato te minavaha pokraj kàštata / Jakies dziecko buvito się na podwórku, zawsze kiedy (oni) przechodzili koto domu* "A child was playing in the yard every time when they passed by the house". In these examples we understand the content in the following way: "For one single set (they) it holds that it is true for each past situation (their passing by the house) that there exists another situation, temporally parallel to the first one, which

consists in the existence of an object (a child) for which it is true that it is in the act of playing". It is evident from the Bulgarian and the Polish examples that regardless of the position of the nominal phrase *njakoje dete / jakieś dziecko* "a child" in the sentence—it is subject and takes the first position—the quantifier indicated by it, and meaning existence, is the innermost: it is within the scope of all the rest of quantifiers in the sentence. In other words, the sentence is understood as a paraphrase of: "Every time they passed by the house, some child was playing in the yard".

It is worth making a special reference to the fact that at this interpretation the object "a child" is possibly different for each situation when "they passed". The innermost position of the quantifier (the narrowest scope) brings to the fore the situation "playing in the yard", see below the paragraph concerning sentence functional perspective. In cases when a given existential quantification meaning receives by all means the widest possible scope, i.e. all the other quantifiers are within its scope, we say that this existentiality quantification meaning is strong. The indicators of strong existential meaning provide instruction that (Ex) overflows the scope of other quantifiers, and in particular of the quantifiers coming from the predicate group. In this way the corresponding object whose existence is confirmed by the sense of (Ex), belongs to the situation of the statement, for example as in the sentences: *Naposlédak go izmáčvaba edni misli / Ostatnio męczyły go pewne myśli* "Some thoughts have been torturing him lately", where the quantification meaning indicated by the phrase "some thoughts" is strong and therefore has the widest possible scope. The scope of this quantifier is the widest one, regardless of the position of the form in the arrangement of the sentence. In other words, regardless of the word order, the sentences are equal in the strength of the quantification meaning given by the nominal phrase in the position of subject, for example: *Edni misli go izmáčvaba naposlédak / Pewne myśli ostatnio męczyły go* "Some thoughts have been torturing him lately" (the subject here takes the first position as in the above ex.)

7.2. In order to clarify the problem of the difference between the uses of strong and weak means indicating existentiality in the two languages, let us discuss the following examples: *Vsički bjabme angažirani v njakvoja (po njakvoja, pone edna) rabota, kojato ni otnemaše cjaloto vreme / Wszyscy byliśmy zaangażowani w sprawie, która nam zabierała bardzo dużo czasu* "We were all engaged in some task which took all our time". Both of these sentences are interpreted like this: "For one single set (we) it is true that there has been a state in the past (were) for which it has been true for each one (of us) that there exists an object (a task) with which he has been busy" (it is possible, too, that this task is a different one for every person). However, in the sentences: *Vsički bjabme zaangażirani v edna (njakakva) rabota, kojato ni otnemaše cjaloto vreme / Wszyscy byliśmy zaangażowani u*

pewnej sprawie, która nam zabierała bardzo dużo czasu "We were all engaged in a task which took all our time", a similar interpretation as the above one is not correct, because of the presence of a strong existential meaning coming from the nominal phrase "a task" which leads to the widest possible quantifier scope. The right interpretation here should be: "There exists an object (a task) for which it is true that for one single set (we) in the past there has been a state (were) in which it is true for each one of us, that we are engaged in this object" (i.e. there is only one task, and we were all engaged in it). Thus, while in the first example the existential quantifier coming from the nominal phrase "some (a kind of, at least one) task" is within the scope of the quantifiers drawn from the other sentence fragments: "we all, were engaged", and is the innermost one, in the second example the corresponding quantifier coming from the phrase "a (one) task" is the outermost one.

7.3. With such terms, the semantical status of the indicators of existentiality within the frameworks of the nominal phrase can be systemized in short in the following way:

(1) The Bulgarian and Polish phrases *njakoje x / jakis x* "some x" are typical indicators of weak existentiality, as in the sentences: *Njakoje slanej pee vsjaka nošt pod prozoreca mi / Jakis stovnik špievua (každa) nocą pod oknem* "Some nightingale sings under my window every night". The absence of an article form - which has not the meaning of an indefinite article in Bulgarian - is a morphological index in Bulgarian, which also indicates weak existentiality. The absence of an article form in Bulgarian can indicate weak existentiality only in cases where the non-articled nominal phrase 'x' can be replaced by 'some x' without the occurrence of any change in the semantics of the sentence. Other indicators of weak existentiality in Bulgarian are *ne vseki x, ne vsički x, pone edin x* "not every x, not all the x, at least one x", and in Polish: *jakis x* "some x", *nie każdy x* "not every x", *przynajmniej jeden x*, "at least one x" etc.

For example: *Njakakvi ženi te čakat / Jakieś panie czekają na ciebie* "Some ladies are waiting for you"; *Pobărzajte, zašto to ne vseki šte nameri tazi kniga / Pośpieszcie się, bo nie każdy dostanie tę książkę* "Hurry up, for not everyone will find this book"; *Kazaba mi, če ne vsički učastnici v konferencijata sa pristignali / Powiedzieli mi, że nie wszyscy uczestnicy konferencji już przyjechali* "I was told that not all the participants of the conference have arrived yet"; *Neka pone edin ot vas bade smel i kaže istinata / Niech przynajmniej jeden z was będzie odważny i powie prawdę* "I wish at least one of you could be brave and tell the truth".

2) A major indicator of strong existentiality in Bulgarian is *edin x* "one x", like in the sentences: *Utře šte se srešna s edin advokat* "I am going to see a / one attorney tomorrow". In Polish this meaning could be found in the phrase *pewien x* as in the sentence: *Jutro spotkam się z pewnym adwokatem*

"Tomorrow I shall meet a certain lawyer". A similar meaning is sometimes borne by the phrases *njakakäv x* "some x", also the empty morphological index, in case it is equal to *edin x* "one x" in terms of quantification meaning, i.e. in cases when the morphological zero is an indefinite article, and the same applies for the phrase *izvesten x* "a certain x" and the Polish phrase *jeden x* but only when it is not with its meaning of uniqueness (see chapter 1 of this section). In Polish we can often meet, in such cases, non-full articulation of the existential quantification, which could be completed by *pevien x* "a certain x", *niektörzy, niektóre, niektóre x, niektöry x* "some, some of x". These same phrases are equal in the strength of their quantification meaning to the above pointed Bulgarian existential phrases, for example: *Niektóre panie wolä brylanty, a nie kwiaty / Njakoi ženi predpočitat brihantite pred cvejtata* "Some women prefer diamonds to flowers", **Jakiés panie wolä brylanty, a nie kwiaty / *Njakakövi ženi predpočitat brihantite pred cvejtata* "Several women prefer diamonds to flowers". If we compare Polish *pevien x* "a certain x" with *jakiés x* "an x", and *niektóre x, niektöry x* "some of x", with *jakiés x*, we shall see that they constitute the opposition strong/weak existential meanings of the nominal phrase - in most of the cases where they are used. However, it is important to point out the fact that in both languages some of these means can engender both strong and weak existential meanings. This we are going to prove below through the presented linguistic material which illustrates the indicators of existentiality in the nominal phrase when the latter is in the position of subject in the sentence. The ability of the given means to be bearers of both strong and weak meanings, as well as their ability to have other quantification meanings, enables us to make a precise comparison between the Bulgarian and the Polish means indicating strong and weak existentiality, having in mind the form and not its application in the separate sentence. The linguistic material investigated confirms the classification we have made up on the basis of both indicative and various non-indicative contexts. Similar observations have been carried out by Descles and Karolak, whose works were highly valuable for working out this part of the study, and this is reflected in some of the examples used here (belonging to the last author mentioned). The idea of additional semantic differentiators of the Bulgarian phrases *njakakäv, njakoi, edin* "some, a, one", the absence of a morpheme for the indefinite article, as well as the Polish *pevien, jeden, jakiés* "a certain, one, some" which should not go outside the frameworks of the quantificational model for description of certain linguistic categories, belongs, however, to the author of the present study.

7.4. The adopted strength of quantification meanings provides a satisfactory explanation (within this model's frameworks) to the observations of differing 'indefiniteness' of the nominal phrases, which are often to be found in literature, too. Compare:

- (1) Kazaha mi, že šte trjábva da se konsultiram s edin lekar / Powiedziano mi, bym się skonsultował z pewnym lekarzem. / Powiedziano mi, bym się skonsultował z pewnym lekarzem
I have been told I will have to see a doctor (a particular one).
- (2) Kazaha mi, že šte trjábva da se konsultiram s njakoj lekar / Powiedziano mi, bym się skonsultował z jakimś lekarzem; / Powiedziano mi, bym się skonsultował z lekarzem
I have been told I will have to see some (any) doctor.

In sentences (1) the nominal phrase *edin lekar / pevien lekar* "a doctor" is understood as more 'definite' than the phrase *njakoj lekar / jakiés lekar* "some doctor" and the Polish phrase containing non-fully articulated quantification *lekarz* "some doctor" in sentences (2).

In a certain sense, this impression is not groundless, because according to the analysis adopted in the present paper, it stems from the different 'arrangement' of quantifiers coming from respectively *edin lekar / pevien lekar* and *njakoj lekar / jakiés lekar, lekarz*, in the semantic presentation of the two kinds of sentences. For sentences (1) we have the explication: "For a unique situation in the past it is true that it consists in telling me about the existence of an object x, who is a doctor and for whom it holds that in every situation in the future I will have to see x".

The explication for sentences (2) is different: "For a unique situation in the past it is true that it consists in telling me that for each situation in the future there will exist an object x, for which it holds that it is a doctor and that I will have to see him". In other words, in (1) due to their strong quantification meaning, the phrases *edin lekar / pevien lekar* "a doctor" have a quantifier for existence which appears before the quantifiers connected with necessity and with the form futurum, i.e. the corresponding object is "given" before (and regardless of) the future possible situations. To put it in another way, what is meant is a particular doctor that I shall see no matter how things will turn out to be in the future. The scope of the quantifiers in sentences (2) is different: here, the weak quantification characteristics of "some doctor" impose an understanding of the existence quantifier as the innermost, i.e. we accept that there exists an object for each possible future situation—some doctor who depends on the corresponding situation (and whom I will have to see). Since we can, among all possible future situations, imagine situations where each separate doctor could be met, then the phrase "some doctor" relates to an unspecified, to any doctor. For this reason, in a similar Bulgarian linguistic situation, especially if it is possible or obligatory, the word *njakoi* "some" develops the meaning of "any one", and in Polish *jakiés* "some" is transferred into *jakiés = jakikohwiek* "an arbitrary", for example: *Izvikaite lekar* → *Izvikaite njakoj lekar* → *Izvikaite koj i da e lekar* → *Izvikaite jakiegoš lekarza* → *Zawolajcie jakiegohwiek lekarza* "Send for a doctor → Send for some doctor → Send

for any doctor". From the above examples it is clearly seen that the phrases *njakoј x / jakis x* "some x" included in the context (2) and especially if it is not indicative, develop another quantification meaning—that of universality. Also see below about the quantificational information which can be extracted from the so called "concessive relatives", subject to investigations by Koseska-Toszewa (1982), Gargov (1987).

7.5. When analysing sentences of the type: *Ptici pejat v gradinite / V gradinite pejat ptici* "Birds are singing in the gardens. / In the gardens are singing birds" the followers of the theory of sentence functional perspective draw the attention to both word order and intonation, through which various sorts of the so called theme-rheme information are expressed in this type of sentences, see Ivančev (1957), Koseska (1970), Bogusławski (1977), Karolak (1987). We should pay special attention here to this fact, because of the information concerning the place of the quantifier and the strength connected with it. As we have already mentioned, there exists a parallel between strong quantification meaning and theme on the one hand, and between weak quantification information and rheme on the other hand; as far as theme and rheme are understood, like in Bogusławski's views (1977: 38), as "the object spoken about" (datum) and "the thing which is being uttered" (novum). Sentences of the type *Birds are singing*, contain *birds* as rheme and *singing* as theme. Sentences of the type *Singing are birds / Singing are the birds* contain *singing* as rheme and *birds* as theme. In Polish, in contrast to Bulgarian where there is as well a sentence containing a nominal phrase with the article, it is only word order and intonation that render information of this kind, compare: *Ptaki śpiewają*—with *ptaki* as rheme and *śpiewają* as theme, and *Śpiewają ptaki*—with *śpiewają* as rheme and *ptaki* as theme. We consider sentences of the type: *Ptici pejat v gradinata / Ptaki śpiewają w ogródku* "Birds are singing in the gardens" as equal in meanings to sentences containing strong existential phrases, compare: *Edni ptici pejat v gradinata / Pewne ptaki śpiewają w tym ogródku*; but *Edna ptica pee / Ptak śpiewa w ogródku* "Some birds are singing in the garden / A bird is singing in the garden / One bird is singing in the garden". In contrast, the sentences of the type: *Pejat ptici / Śpiewają ptaki* "There are birds singing" are sentences containing weak existential meanings of the nominal phrases, compare: *Pejat njakoi ptici / Śpiewają jakies ptaki* "Singing are some birds". In reference to the difference between the Bulgarian *njakoј x* "some x" and *edin x* "one x" and the Polish *jakis x* "some x" and *pevien x* "a certain x"—which we pointed above—we should stress on the fact that the investigated large linguistic material in both languages confirms the presence of certain stylistic differences in the use of these phrases, according to which the Polish *pevien* "a certain" is classified as literary, and in such case its corresponding form is not only the Bulgarian *edin* "one"—which is from the point of view of

stylistics more neutral—but also the Bulgarian *izvesten* "certain"—which is the literary variant of "one", for example: *Toј ima izvestni dokazatelstva / On ma pewne dowody* "He has certain evidences = some evidences".

7.6. If we compare the use of the Polish *jakis / pewien* "some / a certain" we shall be able to note as well the fact that their meaning depends not only on the modal context, but on their syntactic function, too, for example: *Widziałam wczoraj pewną swoją przyjaciółkę / Widział wczera edna twoja priateľka* "Yesterday I saw one of your friends", which is different from *Widziałam wczoraj jakąs swoją przyjaciółkę / Wczera widział twoja priateľka* "Yesterday I saw a friend of you". *Po jakimś czasie ktoś zapukał / Sled vreme se počuka* "Sometime later someone knocked", which is equal to *Po pewnym czasie ktoś zapukał / Sled njakoe vreme se počuka* "Sometime later someone knocked".

This fact reconfirms the existence of quantificational polisemy in most of the linguistic means and here the Bulgarian *edna* "one" indicates universality. This circumstance is a very important manifestation of the influence of modality over the semantic status of the indicated quantification meanings: in imperative contexts, the nominal phrases taking the position of object or adverbial modifier are most often found with information of uniqueness or universality quantification. In this type of contexts existentiality is usually indicated in both languages through the forms providing its 'full' articulation: i.e. phrases like *pone edin / prynajimnij eden* "at least one", compare: *Otvori pone edin prozorec! / Otvor prynajimnij jedno okno!* "Open at least one window" with *Povikaj edna žena!*, when it is equal to *Povikaj samo edna (= edna edinštvena) žena!* "Send for a woman", when it is equal to "Send for one (only one) woman!" Compare the analogous Polish sentences where the nominal phrase can be understood as either universal or uniqueness: *Otwórzcie jakies (jakiekolwiek) okno! / Otwórzcie jedno okno!* "Open a window!"

7.7. Strong existential nominal phrases occupying the position of subject can also develop other quantification meanings (for example the meaning of universality). However, here the mechanism is different form that in the case of nominal phrases with weak basic quantification meaning of existentiality. While universality there originated from the accomplishment of a universality quantification over a given set of situations, in this case universality is achieved according to the quantifying laws of Morgan, popular today mostly under the title 'Berneiss formulae' ($(\exists x)A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow (Vx)(A \rightarrow B)$). Thus in the sentence: *Edin muž može da se oženi i na 80 godini, a edna žena ne može* "A man can marry at the age of 80, but a woman can't", the noun phrase "a man" has a meaning of universality (= each man, any man) due to the reason just pointed out; the phrase "a woman" also has a universality

meaning (= no woman), i.e. there is no woman who can marry at the age of 80. This should not be mixed with the meaning of existentiality - not every woman, as is the case in the sentence: *Ne vsjaka žena na 80 godini može da se omāži = Imā ženi, koito ne mogat da se omāžat na 80 godini* "Not every woman at the age of 80 can marry = There are women who can't marry at this age". Compare these with the modal sentences where the forms containing *edin* x "a / one x" develop as well a meaning of universality quantification. (Cf. Ro Hauge 1987). Let us draw our attention once again to the fact that when found in unique situations in present tense, the forms *edna / njakakva* "a / one and some / kind of" are interchangeable: *Edna žena tiča nasam = Njajakva žena tiča nasam / Pevna kobjeta tu biegnie = Jedna kobjeta tu biegnie* "A woman is running to us = Some woman is running to us". A similar changeability exists in Bulgarian also for unique situations in the past, when *edin* "a / one" does not tend to mean uniqueness. The influence of temporality on the quantification is manifested in the tendency of nominal phrases in the sentence to acquire 'more definite' interpretations - for instance existentiality tending towards uniqueness - when terminative aspect aorist is used, indicating uniqueness of the respective situation. Thus the sentence: *Edin circk pristigna včera* "A circus arrived yesterday", although it admits an interpretation like: 'Some circus arrived yesterday', at the same time has another reading: 'Only (exactly) one circus arrived yesterday'. In this case the phrase 'a circus' (in the singular) has the meaning of uniqueness. It must be pointed out again that this uniqueness is weak and tends to indicate a quantitative meaning, which is confirmed as well by examples containing phrases in the plural, where such a transition is impossible.

7.8. Non-indicative contexts. The most typical observation here is that the differences between the uses of the forms *edin*, *njakakäv*, *njako* "a, an, one, some" and the non-articled forms x are quite often neutralized, as for example:

1) meaning of strong existentiality: *Po oživljenieto v pogleda mu sega, javno beše, če njakoja (= njakakva, edna) nova pričina i važna go voděše tuk* "From the brightening of his look now, it was evident that a / some, a kind of / new and important reason had brought him here".
 2) meaning of universality: *Dali šie uspejat da vidjat njakakvo (= njakoe, koeto i-da e) predavane?* "Will they manage to see some (= any, no matter which) programme?"

3) meaning of weak existentiality: *Už njako* (= *njakakäv*, *pone edin*) *car, kojto imal gošamo bogatstvo, šjtal da ja poiska za žena* "She pretended that a some, at least one, very rich king would ask her to marry him". The last sentence should be told from the sentence: "A very rich king would allegedly ask her to marry him", which has another interpretation (in which the phrase "a king" is strongly existential: "the first case describes an imaginary world in which there exists a person (a very rich king) who is to propose while

the second case concerns a person (existing in the world belonging to the situation of the utterance) who is a king and is very rich, but who proposes just in an imaginary world (an alleged world)". The above examples concern contexts in which the quantification of the respective situations is one of universality. In modal contexts (of possibility), connected with the existential quantification over the respective set of situations, a similar neutralization is not to be found, e.g.: *Väzmožno e njakakäv nem poznat da ja izprati na garata* "A friend of hers may see her off at the station"; *Väzmožno e njako* *nejm poznat da ja izprati na garata* "Some of her friends may see her off at the station". In the first case, the phrase "a friend of hers = a particular friend of hers" gives information of a person who is likely to see her off; in the second case, the information concerns the possibility for an act of seeing off to be completed (i.e. the first sentence accomplishes the situation 'existing + possible', and the second one - 'possible + existing', (cf. Koseska-Toszewa 1978) in connection with neutralization in the use of the Bulgarian *njako* / *njakakäv* "some / a, an" and the Polish *ktos* "somebody", "someone" and *ktokolwiek* "anybody".

Address of the author:

Institute of Slavistics of PAS, P.O. Box 24, 00-901 Warsaw PKIN Poland.

- Karolak S. (1989), *L'article et la valeur du syntagme nominal*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
- Koseska V. (1970), "O tzw. kategorii określoności (na materiałach bułgarskich i rosyjskich)", *Rocznik Slawistyczny*, XXXI, Kraków, 39-45.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1977), *System temporalny gwar bułgarskich (na tle języka literackiego)*, Wrocław.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1978), "Informacja o określoności we frazie werbalnej i nominalnej języka bułgarskiego, polskiego i rosyjskiego", *Slavia Orientalis* XXVII, 2, Warszawa, 259-267, also: *Otázky slovanské syntaxe*, t. 4, cz. 1, Brno 1979, 205-212.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1982), *Semantyczne aspekty kategorii określoności/nieokreśloności (na materiale z języka bułgarskiego, polskiego i rosyjskiego)*, Wrocław.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1983), "Konstrukcje z polskim *mieć* i bułgarskim *imam*", *Studia linguistica memoriae Z. Steieber dedicata*, Wrocław, 137-149.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1983), "O kategorii określoności - nieokreśloności w planie konfrontatywnym (na przykładzie z języka bułgarskiego, polskiego i rosyjskiego)", *Z Polskich Studiów Slawistycznych*, seria 6, *Językoznawstwo*, Warszawa, 187-194.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1985), "Jak rozgraniczyć użycie aorystu od niedokonyanych od użycia imperfectum od niedokonyanych", *Studia z filologii polskiej i słowiańskiej*, Warszawa, 195-201.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1986), "De l'emploi de l'article en langue bulgare, en comparaison avec d'autres langues balkaniques", *Językowe Studia Bałkanistyczne*, t. 1, Wrocław, 17-25.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1987), "Kategoria określoności / nieokreśloności a kwantyfikacja na gruncie języka naturalnego", *Od kodu do kodu*, UW Warszawa, 43-51.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. (1987), "O pewnych strukturach logiczno-semantycznych i ich odpowiednikach w języku polskim i bułgarskim", *Slawistyczne studia językoznawcze*, Wrocław, 149-153.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. & Mazurkiewicz A. (1988), "Net Representation of sentences in natural languages", *Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Petri Nets 1988*, Springer - Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York London Paris Tokyo, 249-266.
- Koseska-Toszewa V. & Gargov G. (1990), *Semantičnata kategorija opredelenost / neopredelenost, Bălgarsko - polska sâpostavitelna gramatika*, t. 2, Sofija.
- Rasiowa H. (1975), *Wstęp do matematyki współczesnej*, Warszawa, 211-255.
- Reichenbach H. (1967), "Elementy logiki formalnej", *Logika i język*, Warszawa, 85-216.
- Revzin I. (1978), *Struktura języka jak modelitrujującej systemy*, Moskwa, 133-273.
- Ro Hauge H. (1987), "Opit za talkuvane na generičnata upotreba na edin v bălgarski", *II Kongres po Bălgarsika, Sofija, Dokladi*, tom III, 442-446.
- Russell B. (1970), *Mój rozwój filozoficzny*, Warszawa, 276-279.
- Russell B. (1967), "Denotowanie. Deskrypcje", *Logika i język*, Warszawa, 253-293.
- Stankov V. (1984), "Za kategoriata neopredelenost na imenata v bălgarski ezik i nejnoto izrazjavane", *Bălgarski ezik* 1984, kn. 3, Sofija.
- Tolstoj N. (1957), "Značenje kratkih i polnyh form prilagatel'nyh v staroslavjanskom jazyke", *Voprosy slavjanskogo jazykoznaniia* 2, Moskva.
- Zaimov I. (1982), *Suprasălski ili Retkov sbornik*, Sofija, 5-9.
- Ajdukiewicz K. (1968), *Logika pragmatyczna*, Warszawa.
- Barwise J. & Cooper R. (1981), "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language", *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 4, Amsterdam, 159-219.
- Barwise J. & Perry J. (1983), *Situations and Attitudes*, Bradford Books, MIT.
- Bellert I. (1971), "On the use of linguistic quantifying operators", *Poetics*, 2: 71-86.
- Bellert I. (1978), "Ob odnom uslovii svjaznosti teksta", *Novoe v zarubežnoj lingvistikie*, Progress, Moskva, 172-207.
- Bellert I. & Zawadowski M. (forthcoming), *Pre order structure of linguistic quantifiers*, Montreal.
- Bogusławski A. (1977), *Problems of the Thematic-Rhematic Structure of Sentences*, Warszawa, 75-229.
- Frege G. (1982), "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", *Zeitschr. für Phil. und phil. Kritik*, 100: 25-50.
- Gargov, G. (1987), "O pewnym zbiorze, przysłówków temporalnych i kwantifikatorach uogólnionych", in V. Koseska-Toszewa & J. Mindak (eds.), *Studia gramatyczne bułgarsko-polskie. Tom II: Określoność/nieokreśloność*, Wrocław, Inst. Słowianoznawstwa PAN: 17-39.
- Guentcheva Z. & Descles J. (1980), "Recherches sur les valeurs des indefinis 'NIAKOJ' et 'NIAKAKAV' en bulgare", in *Operations de determination. Theorie et description*, v. 1, Paris, 239-286.
- Grzegorzczak R. (1972), "Wykładniki kwantyfikacji w polskim zdaniu", *Z polskich studiów slawistycznych*, Warszawa, 13-19.
- Hintikka J. (1980), "Svjazka est', semantičeskie igry i semantičeskaja odnositel'nost", *Logiko-epistemologičeskie issledovanija*, Moskva, 323-350.
- Ivančev Sv. (1957), "Nabljudenija vărhu upotrebeta na člena v bălgarski ezik", *Bălgarski ezik* 6, Sofija, 499-524.
- Ivančev Sv. (1967), "Kăm vâpros za členuvaneto na generično upotrebenija podlog", *Ezik i literatura*, Sofija.
- Karolak S. (1987), "O nieokreśloności", *Studia gramatyczne bułgarsko - polskie*, v. II. *Określoność / nieokreśloność*, Wrocław, 41-64.